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Equity flailing? Against ad hocery in unjustified enrichment 
 
This note examines the Outer House case of Advocate General for Scotland v John Gunn and 
Sons Ltd.1 It relates briefly the facts and result, then addresses two points: the general 
approach to unjustified enrichment, and the role of equity in that area. 
Under the Finance Act 2001, the United Kingdom levied the commercial exploitation 
of quarried shale and spoil. Some undertakings were exempted from the levy, including the 
defender. In 2013, the European Commission determined that the exemptions from which the 
defender benefitted constituted unlawful state aid under articles 107-108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. The Crown sued to recover the advantage obtained by 
the defender in the form of the exemption: it had to restore the market. 
The Lord Ordinary (Uist) decided quantum in the Crown’s favour, rejected John 
Gunn’s defences, and granted decree based on the applicable European Union legal regime. 
However, the Court did not favour the Crown’s case on unjustified enrichment:  
I do not know why the pursuer thought it either necessary or appropriate to include an 
alternative claim for unjust enrichment at common law [in] this action. […] I see no 
good reason for the inclusion of a case based on unjust enrichment, which raises 
considerations of equity which do not arise in the claim based on EU law. 2  
This note will examine the unjustified enrichment aspect of the case. 
 
A. UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT AND EQUITY GENERALLY 
“The precise contours of unjustified enrichment” in Scots law “remain to be mapped”.3 But 
high authority establishes the fundamentals. In Shilliday v Smith,4 Lord Rodger said: 
[A] person may be said to be unjustly enriched at another’s expense when 
he has obtained a benefit from the other’s actings or expenditure, without 
 
1 [2018] CSOH 39 (hereafter “AG v John Gunn”). 
2 AG v John Gunn, para [60].  
3
 Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Patersons of Greenoakhill Ltd [2015] CSOH 137, para [29] per Lord Woolman. For 
modern developments, see HL MacQueen, “The future of unjustified enrichment in Scotland” [2017] RLR 14. 
As to structure, Scots enrichment law is widely considered to embrace three categories of enrichment claim 
based on the manner of enrichment: by (1) transfer (typified, for example, by condictiones indebiti, ob turpem 
vel iniustam causam, and ob causam finitum); (2) imposition (as where another’s debt is paid); and (3) 
interference with rights (as where another’s property is surreptitiously exploited). See, eg, the leading short 
account in HL MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag & Henderson: The Law of Scotland (14th edn, 2017) ch 
24. Whilst enrichment by transfer may to a point be safe (following Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 725), the master 
plan remains an academic roadmap to relevant concrete authority: R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, Vol 
II (2013), para 1.52. 
4 1998 SC 725, 727 (Lord Kirkwood and Lord Caplan generally agreeing). 
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there being a legal ground which would justify him in retaining that benefit. 
The significance of one person being unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is that in general terms it constitutes an event which triggers a right 
in that other person to have the enrichment reversed. 
And in Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian RC,5 Lord Hope said that “once 
the pursuer has averred the necessary ingredients to show that prima facie he is entitled to [a] 
remedy, it is for the defender to raise the issues which may lead to a decision that the remedy 
should be refused on grounds of equity”. 
Subsequently, in Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd,6 Lord Hope 
mentioned whether “it would be equitable to compel the defenders to redress the enrichment” 
as something which the pursuer must show. But Lord Hope’s Dollar Land speech, taken as a 
whole, can be reconciled with the view expressed in Morgan Guaranty. We are told in Dollar 
Land that the correct approach to unjustified enrichment is “to identify the factors which are 
essential to the success of a case”; and that Lord Rodger in the Inner House was correct to 
say “that the pursuers must show that the defenders have been enriched at their expense, that 
there is no legal justification for the enrichment and that it would be equitable to compel the 
defenders to redress the enrichment.”7 Contradiction in Lord Hope’s thinking is discounted 
by this passage:8 
[E]quitable considerations suggest that CIN should be subjected to the 
remedy of recompense unless the contract itself provides an answer to the 
claim that the enrichment was unjustified. It is on this point, the second in 
the list of factors, that DLC’s case seems to me to run into insuperable 
difficulty. 
So his Lordship’s initial mention of equity in Dollar Land referred to the conclusion that one 
must reach when two “factors”, (i) enrichment at another’s expense, (ii) without justification, 
are established. This view is fortified by Lord Rodger’s speech in the Inner House in Dollar 
Land:9 his Lordship deduced his statement of principle from an observation by Lord Hope in 
Morgan Guaranty: unjustified enrichment claims “are all means to the same end, which is to 
redress an unjustified enrichment upon the broad equitable principle nemo debet locupletari 
 
5 1995 SC 151, 166 (Lord Mayfield and Lord Kirkwood agreeing). 
6
 1998 SC (HL) 90, 99 (for the Appellate Committee). 
7 Ibid, 99; citing 1996 SC 331, 353. 
8 Ibid, 99-100. 
9 1996 SC 331, 353. 
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aliena jactura”.10 This final remark is the foundation for the other two. Unlocking it explains 
them in turn. It refers to the historic, equitable basis, of unjustified enrichment in Scots law11 
– the normative idea – that unjustified enrichment at another’s expense is inequitable. This is 
the only way to make sense of some key passages in foundational12 cases.13 And it is different 
to Lord Hope’s statement in Morgan Guaranty (quoted above, and appearing ten pages 
further on in his opinion from the nemo debet dictum) that the defender addresses equity once 
the pursuer has established the defender’s unjustified enrichment at the pursuer’s expense. 
That was about introducing defences into the unjustified enrichment enquiry. This is a 
principal role in practice of equity in Scots enrichment law,14 and cases confirm this reading 
of Morgan Guaranty.15 
 
B. UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT AND EQUITY IN JOHN GUNN 
Lord Uist said that the defender had been unjustifiably enriched at the Crown’s expense:16 
[John Gunn] was clearly enriched to the amount of the Aggregates Levy 
which it should have paid but did not pay and this was at the expense of the 
Crown which did not receive payment of the levy. […] I do not accept the 
submission for the defenders that the retrospecti[ve] classification of the 
exemption from the levy as unlawful did not render any benefits rendered 
under it at the time it was lawful unjustifiable at common law. 
But then, his Lordship concluded against liability:17 
The first defender did nothing that was considered to be wrong at the time 
the exemption was applied. It acted in accordance with the clear provisions 
of domestic law. It is correct to say that it had no responsibility for the 
retrospective classification of the shale exemption as unlawful. If the 
 
10 1995 SC 151, 155; referred to by Lord Hope himself in Dollar Land 1998 SC (HL) 90, 98. 
11 See Shilliday 1998 SC 725, 734 (Lord Caplan). See also Stair, Institutions, I, 7, 6. 
12 On the effect of Morgan Guaranty, Shilliday, and Dollar Land, see Robertson Construction Central Ltd v 
Glasgow Metro LLP [2009] CSOH 71, para [18] per Lord Hodge. 
13 For the view that this is not clear-cut, see DJ Carr Ideas of Equity (2017) ch 3 especially paras 3-92 - 3-100, 
3-109. 
14 There may also be, for example, a public policy string to equity’s enrichment bow. But the courts cannot fire 
off decisions however they wish: Banque Financière de la Cité v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [1999] 1 AC 221, 237, 
per Lord Clyde. 
15 Compagnie Commerciale Andre SA v Artibell Shipping Company Ltd (No 2) 2001 SC 653, para 23, per Lord 
Macfadyen; Corrie v Craig unreported 31 October 2012 (Sh Ct, Kirkcudbright), 2013 GWD 1-55, para 16, per 
Sheriff Brown; McVicar v The Keeper of the Registers of Scotland [2014] CSOH 61, para [10], per Lord 
Doherty (noting common ground between the parties). See also Credit Lyonnais v George Stevenson & Co Ltd 
(1901) 9 SLT 93, 95, per Lord Kyllachy. 
16 AG v John Gunn, para [61]. 
17 AG v John Gunn, para [62]. 
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reasonable person were to consider the circumstances of the present case 
and ask who should in fairness bear the loss I think that the response given 
by him or her would be the taxing authority responsible for what had 
happened. […] When considerations of equity fall to be applied I am of the 
view that they are plainly in favour of the first defender […]. 
Let us first look at the general approach to unjustified enrichment here, before the second 
quoted passage on equity. The defender’s enrichment was an expense saved. It was 
unjustified because, though a statutory regime spared John Gunn the levy, it was unlawful, as 
confirmed by the European Commission’s decision. That the enrichment was an expense 
saved between two parties leads to the question of what kind of enrichment claim was in 
issue.18 In a three party case, there could still be a real transfer where, for example, A pays 
B’s debt to C, saving B that expense. That is not so here, and this points against the better-
established and more specific condictiones. As to enrichment by imposition, the Crown did 
not pay John Gunn’s debt. The exemption meant that there was no debt to be paid. Moreover, 
the Crown did not interfere with John Gunn’s property rights by sparing its expenditure on 
the levy. 
None of this was addressed in John Gunn. Aversion to analysis is now a slight but 
damaging trend in Scots enrichment cases. It is incorrect “that one should focus on the 
principle rather than the categories, either of causes of action or of remedies”.19 In confirming 
that slavish adherence to taxonomy is unnecessary, the cases indicate, or at least presuppose, 
that established categories – and so, previous authorities – will be examined to see if they are 
useful, before their gradual, careful relaxation.20 Whilst judges “are no longer required to 
 
18 The (mostly academic) basis on which the rest of this paragraph proceeds is summarised in n. 3. This 
structure is used for convenience and it is assumed that a search in the books under aforementioned headings 
would lead to relevant authority to assist interested parties. 
19 Pace Sheriff Brown in Corrie v Craig unreported 31 October 2012 (Sh Ct, Kirkcudbright), 2013 GWD 1-55, 
para 20. 
20
 Mactaggart & Mickel Ltd v Hunter [2010] CSOH 130, para [99], per Lord Hodge; Lyon and Turnbull Ltd v 
Sabine [2012] CSOH 178, para [24], per Lord Brodie; Fife Scottish Omnibus v Tay Bridge Joint Board 
unreported 12 June 1997 (IH, Ex Div), 1997 GWD 23-1180, [1997] Lexis Citation 582, p13 of transcript, per 
Lord Prosser, with whom Lord Cameron generally agreed, p5. See also Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 
v Willers 1994 (3) SA 283 (AD), 332-333, per Botha JA, for the Court; McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance 
Carriers CC 2001 (3) SA 482 (SCA), 488 in principio, 489 in principio, Schutz JA, with whom Olivier and 
Cameron JJA agreed; Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterina Ltd [2003] ZASCA 64, 2003 (5) SA 193, 
paras 15-17, per Nvasa JA and Heher AJA, for the Court. The tendency to generalise in a sister jurisdiction of 
Scotland’s, South Africa, is evident in the cases cited, and removes the need always to start with an established 
condictio. But, as Moeng AJ explained in SSI/Tshepega Joint Venture v MEC: Free State Provincial 
Government: Department of Police, Roads and Transport [2015] ZAFSHC 4, paras 14-16, “[t]he current 
situation […] entails that ad hoc extensions are utilised in a careful broadening of the actions of the common 
law, unless the facts of the matter are on all fours with the requirements of a classic action”. 
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shoehorn the facts into a particular style of Roman sandal before the remedy [can] be made to 
fit”,21 the law cannot be allowed to run away with itself. Should established rules not be 
determinative, care is required in deciding the merits of a given case. Unfortunately, no such 
consideration was given here before ready reliance on what was probably a condictio sine 
causa specialis. 
What of Lord Uist’s absolution of the defender based on equitable considerations, 
despite its unjustified enrichment at the Crown’s expense? His Lordship clearly took a 
discretionary approach (“who should in fairness bear the loss”). This is neither new,22 nor 
encouraging. Discretions in enrichment law are generally bounded.23 The one exercised here 
was not. Administering equity does not mean deciding according to a personal sense of 
fairness,24 and, as the Supreme Court has recently noted: “[a] claim based on unjust 
enrichment does not create a judicial licence to meet the perceived requirements of fairness 
on a case-by-case basis”.25 This is what his Lordship did. The specific authorities addressed 
above have clarified the role of equity as an answer to enrichment claims. This went 
unnoticed. It should not surprise that proper defences must be raised before rights are 
extinguished.26 Seen in that light, Lord Uist’s approach here is regrettable. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
On the facts, the defender was plainly enriched at the pursuer’s expense: the former was 
spared outlay on the levy, which transpired to be due to the latter. This was unjustified, since 
the regime under which the exemption was obtained was illegal. However, it would have 
been reassuring had the Court shown itself aware that this was not a run-of-the-mill 
enrichment claim, and that only the most general – and so, potentially unruly – of enrichment 
 
21 Esposito v Barile 2011 Fam LR 67 (Sh Ct, Tayside) para [17], per Sheriff Way. 
22 See MacKays Stores Ltd v Toward Ltd [2008] CSOH 51, para [28], per Lord Drummond Young: “even if the 
requirements of the condictio indebiti were satisfied, the result would be unfair to the defenders”; noted 
critically by R Evans-Jones, (2008) 12 Edin LR 429. 
23 As with the discretion to relax the par delictum rule of the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam, the 
exercise of which, whilst the courts have been reluctant to fetter it, requires examination of the facts (Klokow v 
Sullivan [2005] ZASCA 99, 2006 (1) SA 259, paras 24-28, per Cachalia JA, for the Court) and is subject to 
rules. See, eg, the approach in Afrisure CC v Watson NO [2008] ZASCA 89, 2009 (2) SA 127, paras 39-47, per 
Brand JA, for the Court. 
24 Lord Kames, Principles of Equity (3rd edn, 2013 reprint [1778]) I, 19-21. 
25 Revenue and Customs v Investment Trust Companies [2017] UKSC 29, [2017] 2 WLR 120, para [39], per Lord 
Reed, for the Court. See also the earlier words of Lord Clyde: “The principle of unjust enrichment is equitable in 
the sense that it seeks to secure a fair and just determination of the rights of the parties concerned in the case”, but 
is not “entirely discretionary […] so as to enable a court in any case to withhold a remedy where all the necessary 
elements for its satisfaction have been established”: Banque Financière [1999] 1 AC 221, at 237. 
26 Like change of position: Alliance Trust Savings Ltd v Currie [2016] CSOH 154, paras [38]-[42], per Lord 
Tyre. The term “defence” is used broadly here to designate answers to claims. See further A Dyson et al (eds), 
Defences in Unjust Enrichment (2016). 
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actions was applicable. The only possible defence to the pursuer’s enrichment claim would 
appear to have been change of position. Sparse facts aside, this would almost certainly not 
have availed the defender, contrary to European Union competition law.27 It is submitted that 
Lord Uist’s holding on unjustified enrichment was incorrect. 
More generally, a structured approach to unjustified enrichment is desirable, and 
equity in this area is unsatisfied by unrestrained discretion to ignore conditions of liability. 
These points are uncontroversial. The courts must ensure that the principles are applied in 
enrichment claims. Otherwise, cases may be wrongly decided. The sole cause of the right 
result here was the other law and argument going the pursuer’s way. 
 
 
Mat Campbell 
University of Glasgow 
 
27 See, setting out, describing, and analysing treaty provisions, the Commission documentation, and their effects, 
at AG v John Gunn, paras [2]-[3], [6]-[7], [36]: “What a recipient of State aid did or did not do with the financial 
benefit gained from the application of an unlawful exemption is immaterial as far as the [European] 
Commission is concerned.” See also Joined Cases C‑164/15 P and C‑165/15 P European Commission v Aer 
Lingus and Ryanair ECLI: EU:C:2016:990, para 102. 
